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bstract
hile informal contracts are widely used in modern economies, limited systematic empirical evidence is available to researchers and policy makers.
his paper aims to fill the gap by discussing a selected sample of empirical works through the lens of a theoretical framework that clarifies the role
f informal contracts. We also highlight unexplored research opportunities offered by more recent theoretical models that investigate how informal
ontracts are built over time, how they are subject to path dependency, and how relational rents are created, and are awaiting empirical analysis. 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
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The existence and pervasiveness of informal  contracts—that
s, contracts that are enforced by parties rather than courts—has
een extensively documented in social science. For instance,
anagers often rely on “hand-shake” agreements to support
heir deals (Macaulay, 1963); large corporations such as General
otors rely on informal, internally enforced routines to man-
ge their workers and suppliers (Helper & Henderson, 2014);
nd long-distance traders enter commercial contracts even in
he absence of reliable courts because they are afraid of being
stracized from the market, as under the medieval Law Merchant
Milgrom et al., 1990).
Inspired by these and other works, a rich theoretical litera-
ure has emerged in economics, investigating the conditions that
ake informal contracts feasible, their dynamic patterns, and the
ay formal contracts help sustain and enforce informal ones by
educing the parties’ temptation to renege on their promises. This
iterature is summarized by MacLeod (2007), and Malcomson
2013). However, there is scarce systematic evidence on whether
xisting economic theories correctly predict the determinants
nd consequences of informal contracting. In this paper, we build
n our recent work (Gil & Zanarone, 2015, 2016, 2017) to illus-
rate both the accomplishments and the research opportunities
or empirical researchers in this field.
istrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP. Published
p://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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with purely formal dealership contracts, but consistent with the
interaction of formal and informal provisions. If dealership con-
tracts were purely formal, retail prices should decrease onceR. Gil, G. Zanarone / Revista d
Following Gil and Zanarone (2015, 2017), we begin by
ummarizing the key predictions received from economic mod-
ls of stationary informal contracts—that is, contracts that
o not change over time—and discussing recent empirical
orks that provide evidence on these predictions. In the sec-
nd part of the paper, we suggest directions for future empirical
esearch. On one hand, there are important untested predictions
f stationary informal contracting model, particularly those on
he coexistence and interaction between formal and informal
ontract. On the other hand, there are new theoretical predic-
ions that await careful empirical analysis. In particular, the
ore recent economic models relax conventional simplifying
ssumptions—namely, symmetric information and the absence
f liquidity constraints—and predict that far from being station-
ry, optimal informal contracts may gradually evolve over time,
nd may be subject to cycles of cooperation and path depend-
ncy. Following Gil and Zanarone (2016), we conclude the paper
y discussing some strategies for testing the predictions gener-
ted by this new theoretical frontier.
esting  for  informal  contracting  in  stationary
nvironments
he  choice  of  enforcement  regime
A first set of testable implications from the literature regard
he choice of enforcement regime—that is, the extent to which
ontracting parties use formal or informal contracts to govern
heir transactions. In particular, because informal contracts are
nforced by the parties’ threat of terminating a long-term collab-
rative relationship, their use is predicted to increase when the
arties have a long horizon and/or value future payoffs highly,
hen their outside options following breakdown of the relation-
hip are not too attractive, and when their opportunity cost of
onoring informal obligations, and hence their short-run temp-
ation to breach, is not too large.
Ideally, to test these hypotheses we would need measures
or the following variables. First, we would need a dependent
ariable indicating whether a formal contract exists. Second, we
ould need exogenous measures for the parties’ intertemporal
iscount rate and their payoffs outside the relationship. Finally,
e would need variation in the agent’s opportunity cost of hon-
ring an informal agreement. We discuss below two examples of
mpirical works testing this set of predictions. More examples,
nd a more technical discussion of the underlying econometric
hallenges, can be found in Gil and Zanarone (2015).
First, Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2009) study the choice
etween explicit and implicit employment agreements (EAs)
or CEOs in S&P 500 firms. They find that the use of explicit
As (measured by an indicator for whether the firm’s SEC
lings report an explicit agreement) increases in the CEO’s
erceived uncertainty about the firm’s future prospects (mea-
ured by sales volatility, the rate at which firms in the industry
hange ownership and control, and an indicator for whether the
EO is new to the firm). This result is consistent with the pre-
iction because when the firm’s prospects are uncertain (the
ntertemporal discount rate is high), promising a purely discre- sinistração 52 (2017) 492–496 493
ionary compensation to the CEO is not credible, because there’s
 high chance that the CEO-firm relationship will soon end, and
ence the compensation promise will not be honored.
Second, Gil (2013) exploits a data set of movie exhibition
ontracts where 22 distributors place their movies on the screens
f one Spanish exhibitor. The author had access to internal com-
any records detailing whether distributors and the exhibitor
sed formal revenue-sharing terms or not. The paper shows that
ovies that did well during their US release (which occurs a
ew months earlier than the Spanish release) are more likely
o use a formal contract than movies that were not released in
he US, or were released but did not perform well. This result
s consistent with the prediction because when the agreement
s completely informal, the exhibitor, who collects revenues
pfront, is tempted to renege, the more so the larger the movie’s
evenues. To mitigate the exhibitor’s reneging hazard, movies
ith high expected revenues are governed by formal contracts,
reventing the exhibitor from retaining the movie revenues.
ontracts  and  outcomes  under  a  given  enforcement  regime
A second set of predictions in the existing literature regards
he optimal actions and contract terms within a given enforce-
ent regime (purely formal, informal, or a mixture of formal and
nformal). When the predictions differ depending on whether
nformal contracts are used or not, they allow us to indirectly
est for the presence of informal contracts and their interaction
ith formal ones.
Corts and Singh (2004) study the choice between turnkey
ontracts (akin to fixed-price) and day-rate contracts (akin to
ost-plus) in offshore oil drilling. Turnkey contracts provide
rillers with stronger incentives to cut costs than day-rate con-
racts, but are also more rigid, and hence costlier to renegotiate
hen project specifications need to be changed. Using a sample
f 1476 drilling projects, and an instrumental variable approach
o control for the endogenous choice of drillers, Corts and Singh
2004) find that, all else equal, projects are less likely to be gov-
rned by a turnkey contract when the oil company and the driller
ave worked together in the past.1 They interpret this result as
vidence that informal self-enforcing agreements and formal
ncentive contracts (i.e., turnkey contracts) are substitutes, rather
han complements.
Zanarone (2009) studies how vertical restraints in Italian
ar dealership contracts changed after a 2002 EU regulation
rohibited manufacturers to assign dealers to exclusive ter-
itories. Among other results, he finds that, while contracts
efore the legal change mostly relied on quantity floors to con-
ain dealers’ double marginalization, contracts after the legal
hange contained a mix of both quantity floors and price ceil-
ngs. Zanarone (2009) shows that this result is inconsistent1 Similar results are obtained by Kalnins and Mayer (2004) in a study of IT
ervices procurement contracts.
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enforcement constraint affects the evolution of optimal informal
contracts over time. Examples of these models are MacLeod94 R. Gil, G. Zanarone / Revista d
ntra-brand competition is liberalized. Hence, price ceilings
hould be less  necessary after the legal change. In contrast,
f manufacturers and dealers informally agreed to maintain
xclusive territories in the shadow of the law, including formal
rice ceilings would be optimal because price ceilings reduce
he dealers’ short-run gains from selling outside their territory,
nd hence their temptation to breach the informal exclusivity
greement.
Gil and Marion (2013) test for whether the expected dura-
ion of relationships between contractors and subcontractors
mproves their ability to bid competitively for procurement con-
racts. Relying on data for 10 years of Caltrans (California
epartment of Transportation) auctions, they use the num-
er and value of projects auctioned over the next calendar
ear as a measure of the future value of relationships between
ontractors and subcontractors. Their results show that the
igher the potential future value of a relationship, the lower
he posted bids, even after holding constant the number
f past interactions between contractors and subcontractors.
his result is consistent with the idea that a longer time
orizon improves the performance of informal collaborative
elationships.
Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015) have access to an
nvironment—the relationships between rose exporters in
enya and their international clients—where contracts are never
overned by formal provisions. Moreover, they have detailed
ata on the international spot market auction prices for roses.
or an informal exporter-client agreement to be self-enforcing,
he expected future value of their relationship must be at least
s large as the price the exporter forgoes when honoring the
greement instead of selling on the spot market. Consistent
ith the idea that these informal enforcement constraint is bind-
ng, Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015) show that following an
nexpected one per cent change in the spot market price, the
uantity of roses in exporter-client agreements is also reduced
y one per cent, so that the agreement remains self-enforcing.
he idea that measures of the present gains from breaching
n informal agreement (the reneging temptation) provide a
ower bound for the future value of the relationship is fur-
her exploited by two recent empirical papers—Gil, Kim, and
anarone (2017), who study relational adaptation in the US air-
ine industry, and Macchiavello and Miquel-Florensa (2017),
ho study the relative performance of informal contracts and
ertically integrated supply chains in the Costa Rica coffee
ndustry.
Finally, Barron et al. (2016) explores how movie distrib-
tors and exhibitors informally adjust revenue sharing terms
n movie exhibition contracts, and finds that adjustments are
ot contracted formally—that is, realized revenue sharing
ystematically differs from the terms in the formal revenue-
haring agreements. They argue that such adjustments occur
nformally to save on contracting and negotiation costs, and
o affect the allocation of movies to screens. In particu-
ar, Barron et al. (2016) shows that renegotiations of pricing
ontracts are related to decisions about whether to continue
how a movie and, if so, whether to show it in prime
ime.
(
(inistração 52 (2017) 492–496
uture  work
ntested  predictions  from  standard  informal  contracting
odels
Having reached this point, we can address where this
iterature is lacking the most. There is little evidence on how
he cost/quality of formal contracts affects the use/performance
f informal ones. When the parties’ fallback option fol-
owing breakdown of an informal relationship is to keep
rading under arm’s-length formal contracting—as opposed to
ermination—this effect, and hence the extent to which for-
al and informal contracts are complements or substitutes,
s ambiguous (e.g., Klein, 2000; Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy,
994). On the one hand, an increase in the cost (decrease in the
uality) of formal contracts makes it harder to use such contracts
o reduce the parties’ short-term gains from breach, thus making
nformal agreements harder to enforce. On the other hand, poorer
ormal contracts reduce the parties’ fallback option after breach-
ng the informal agreement, thereby increasing their incentive
o cooperate.
The closest suggestive empirical evidence is Johnson,
cMillan, and Woodruff (2002). They find that in European
ountries from the former Soviet block, trade credit increased
hen courts were believed to reliably enforce formal con-
racts. However, this relationship was weaker when suppliers
ere locked into a bilateral monopoly relationship with cus-
omers and, therefore, were likely to keep dealing with them
nder arm’s-length formal contracting following a breakdown
n the informal relationship. While the evidence in Johnson
t al. (2002) is suggestive, it is limited by obvious measurement
nd endogeneity problems. Thus, identifying an appropriate
xperimental setting to thoroughly assess how the availability
f formal contracts affects informal agreements constitutes a
lear opportunity for future research. Such research may exploit
xogenous changes in contract law that affect the feasibility
f termination—as opposed to arm’s-length contracting—as a
allback option, such as termination laws in franchising (e.g.,
rickley, Dark, & Weisbach, 1991). Since court quality and the
egulation of contract termination have been found to vary across
ountries and industries and within countries, the test we are sug-
esting may exploit variation across countries, within a country
ver time, or even within a country and year but across different
ndustries.
esting  the  new  models  of  informal  contracting
Empirical work testing non-stationary dynamic models
f relational contracting are completely missing from the
iterature. An important contribution of these models is
o relax two simplifying assumptions from the more con-
entional models—namely, symmetric information and the
bsence of liquidity constraints—and investigating how the self-2003) and Fuchs (2007), Halac (2012), and Li and Matouschek
2013) on discretionary incentives, and Board (2011) on partner
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KR. Gil, G. Zanarone / Revista d
election in supply chains. To illustrate how one could attempt
o test these models, and given that their predictions vary widely
nd hence are hard to summarize, we briefly discuss Halac
2012) as a representative example, and offer some ideas on how
o test her predictions in the hope that interested researchers may
se our discussion as a starting point to push the empirical fron-
ier further. We provide a more detailed discussion of how to
est the new models of informal contracting in Gil and Zanarone
2016).
In a principal-agent model where the agent does not know
ow much the principal values her future relationship with him,
 key result in Halac (2012) is that both the initial incentive
ontract, and its evolution in the course of the relationship,
mportantly changes depending on whether the principal or
he agent has bargaining power. More precisely, her frame-
ork predicts that at the beginning of a contractual relationship,
onuses in an informal incentive contract should be higher, rel-
tive to those in an optimal formal contract, when the agent
as a strong prior belief that the principal values the relation-
hip, and hence is able to commit. Second, the likelihood of
efaults on informal bonuses by the principal should increase
n the agent’s prior belief when the principal has bargain-
ng power, but not when the agent has bargaining power, as
n the latter case ex ante screening ensures that there are
o defaults in equilibrium. Finally, informal bonus payments,
nd the probability of default, should be increasing over time
hen the principal (the informed party) has bargaining power,
nd non-increasing over time when the agent has bargaining
ower.
To test these predictions, we would need at least four vari-
bles: (i) the incentive bonus offered at the beginning of
n informal principal-agent relationship; (ii) the evolution of
nformally contracted bonus payments in the course of the rela-
ionship; (iii) the allocation of bargaining power between the
rincipal (a company, a manager, a buyer) and the agent (a
EO, a worker, a seller); and (iv) the agent’s prior beliefs
egarding the principal’s type (low or high commitment type
n the model). As said before, collecting data on whether incen-
ive payments are formal or informal is challenging but possible
Gillan et al., 2009; Gil, 2013). The agent’s beliefs about the
ype of the principal can be assessed by looking at whether
he agent has some knowledge of the principal’s history and
eputation—perhaps through public rankings such as Fortune’s
Best Companies to Work For” index—or has specific exper-
ise to judge the principal’s type—for instance, because he has
een an employee or frequent business partner of the principal
n the past. Finally, variables that measure the bargaining power
f the agent would be the degree of unionization of labor force
n a company or location, and whether the principal is a monop-
onist (e.g., sole employer for all workers) in the local labor
arket.
onclusionIn this paper we have discussed how further evidence on
nformal contracting can be produced. Overall, we find that
he existing evidence is broadly consistent with the theoretical
K
Linistração 52 (2017) 492–496 495
redictions from economic models of informal contracting. At
he same time, we notice that the empirical research on informal
ontracts has substantial room to grow and presents plenty of
pportunities. We have hopefully proved this point by showing
ow current tests of the theoretical predictions can be improved,
nd which types of predictions are left untested. We hope our
aper will foster future research that will test and feed our
nderstanding of informal contracts and of their interaction with
ormal ones.
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